escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most pervasive features of actual criminal punishment schemes is the increasing severity of punishments for repeat offenders. This is reflected both in federal sentencing guidelines (Champion, 1989) , and in recent "three strikes" legislation enacted by many states (Shepherd, 2002) . Yet economic models of crime have had surprising difficulty in explaining this practice. The reason may be due to the traditional focus of such models on setting criminal punishments so that only "efficient crimes" are committed. If, by committing a criminal act, the offender signals that he values the act more than the cost that it imposes on society, then why should he face a higher sanction if he chooses to commit the same, efficient act again? It follows that increasing penalties can only be justified if uniform penalties somehow result in underdeterrence. 1 Several previous studies have examined this and other rationales for increasing penalties, but, as noted, they have been hard-pressed to justify them. For example, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) show that increasing penalties may
We acknowledge the very helpful comments of Nuno Garoupa and several referees. 1 Polinsky and Shavell (2000:67) and Posner (2003:228) make this point.
be an optimal way to sort offenders who differ in their illicit gains from committing crimes, but this result only holds under certain parameter values. Flat and decreasing penalty schedules are also possible. Polinsky and Shavell (1998) derive a penalty scheme in which repeat offenders may face harsher punishments compared to first-timers, but this is only true in the following qualified sense: first-timers face less severe punishments than repeaters in the second of two periods, but repeaters face the same (maximal) sanction for their crimes in each period. Thus, the penalty on a particular offender never escalates. Chu, Hu, and Huang (2000) show that increasing punishments for repeat offenders are justified if defendants are sometimes erroneously convicted, based on the presumption that the probability of error declines with each subsequent arrest. Other studies, however, show that, for various reasons, optimal deterrence may actually involve declining penalties for repeat offenders (Burnovsky and Safra, 1994; Dana, 2001; and Emons, 2003a) . 2 Overall, one gets the impression that economic models have overlooked an important aspect of the repeat offender problem.
This paper offers a different explanation for rising penalties, based on the stigma associated with criminal conviction. This stigma can harm both economic and social relationships. Here we focus on the effect of stigma on the labor market in the form of reduced wages for convicts, reflecting, for example, lower productivity, greater risk of theft, or other malfeasance (Rasmusen, 1996) . While the existence of a wage discount has been welldocumented in the literature for a broad range of crimes and offender types, 3 the conventional wisdom has been that the prospect of lost future income should actually enhance deterrence. 4 We show that this logic is correct with respect to first-time offenders who are contemplating their first criminal act, but once an offender has a record, the wage discount reduces deterrence by making legal employment less attractive compared to crime. Thus, to maintain a given level of deterrence for offenders with a record, the criminal sanction has to be raised. The model in the next section shows that such an escalating penalty scheme emerges as the optimal, time-consistent policy in a simple setting where punishment is costly to impose, and all crimes should be deterred. 5 The following section then discusses the robustness of the result to more general settings. The final section offers concluding remarks.
THE MODEL
Consider a population of risk-neutral potential offenders who can commit criminal acts in two periods. Offenders receive a private return of b dollars from each act committed and face an expected penalty that depends on the probability of apprehension, p, and a sanction that potentially depends on b (which is observable) and their criminal record. Specifically, first-time offenders in either period are subject to a sanction s1 (measured in dollars) if caught, while repeat offenders (those with a past conviction) are subject to a sanction s2. (Note that offenders who committed an act in period one but were not caught are treated as first-timers if caught for a second act in period two.)
Individuals who choose not to commit an offense in a given period can earn y dollars in legal employment if they have no criminal record, but they can only earn y dollars if they have a record, where is the earnings penalty associated with criminal conviction. Of course, this penalty is only relevant in period two and only then if the individual committed an act in period one and was caught. We assume that b>y, implying that rational offenders will prefer crime over legal employment in the absence of criminal punishment. In addition, we make the following assumptions: 6 A1: The probability of apprehension, p, is fixed for both periods and independent of the offender's criminal record. 7 A2: Sanctions are non-monetary and hence costly to impose. This assumption, along with the next one, ensures that enforcers will set the sanction as low as possible, given p, to achieve the desired level of deterrence.
A3: A constant fraction, ", of individuals are undeterrable and hence commit crimes in both periods regardless of expected sanctions. Such individuals may be thought of as irrational.
In the context of this model, we first derive the constraints on s1 and s2 such that rational offenders are deterred from committing crimes in both periods. We then minimize the cost of punishment subject to these constraints.
2.1.SANCTIONS THAT DETER RATIONAL OFFENDERS
To ensure time consistency (subgame perfection), 8 we work in reverse sequence, starting with the period two decisions of rational offenders. An offender in period two either has a criminal record or not. If not, his expected return from committing a crime is b ps1, while his return from legal employment is y. The offender is therefore deterred if yEb ps1, 9 or if (1)
Alternatively, if an offender has a criminal record, his expected return from committing a crime in period two is b ps2, while his return from legal employment is y . Thus, he will be deterred if y E b ps2, or if (2)
Note that the lower bound for s2 is larger than for s1, reflecting the inferior labor market opportunities of convicted criminals. This is what necessitates a higher sanction for repeat offenders in order to deter them from committing further crimes. Constraints (1) and (2) are shown graphically in Figure 1 . Now consider the behavior of rational offenders in period one. Their two options are to commit a crime, or to work in legal employment. In comparing these options, they know that they will be deterred from committing future crimes in period two (given (1) and (2)). Thus, an individual who chooses to commit a crime in period one has an expected lifetime income of
where p is the expected wage penalty. Conversely, an individual who chooses not to commit a crime in period one has a lifetime income of 2y. The individual will therefore be deterred from committing a crime in period one if
It follows that the minimum sanction needed to deter first-time offenders in period two ("old" first-timers), given by (1), will also deter first-time offenders in period one ("young" first-timers). Indeed, young first-timers would be deterred by a somewhat smaller penalty, because the wage discount acts as a partial deterrent (Rasmusen, 1996:536) . Thus, constraints (1) and (2) are sufficient to deter crimes by all rational offenders in both periods.
2.2.COST-MINIMIZING SANCTIONS
It remains to derive the socially optimal values of s1 and s2. As noted, these are found by minimizing the total cost of punishment subject to the condition that all rational offenders are deterred (i.e., subject to constraints (1) and (2)).
Total punishment costs equal the number of irrational crimes committed in each period multiplied by the appropriate punishment. 10 If we normalize the total population of offenders to be one, then the number of irrational offenders in period one is ", a fraction p of whom are caught and punished. Thus, total expected costs in period one are "ps1. 11 In period two, the total number of crimes is the same, but punishment costs differ because some offenders are treated as first-timers (those who did not get caught in period one), and some are repeat offenders. The expected cost of punishing firsttimers in period two is thus "p(1Gp)s1, while the expected cost of punishing repeat offenders is "p 2 s2. Summing all these costs across the two periods and simplifying yields 12 10 Since p is fixed, the cost of apprehension is fixed in each period. Thus, we can ignore it in deriving the optimum. 11 We assume that society and the offender weigh the cost of punishment equally. If they attach different costs to punishment, as is likely to be true for prison, then we would need to add an additional weighting factor (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) . However, since this would have no effect on our conclusions, we ignore it here.
12 We ignore discounting. (5)
Increasing Penalties for Repeat
Totally differentiating (5) yields the slope of iso-cost lines in (s2, s1) space:
A set of iso-cost lines is shown in Figure 1 . Since costs are decreasing toward the lower left in the diagram, the optimal point occurs at the intersection of the two constraints (i.e., where both are just binding), implying that
It follows that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, reflecting the period two wage penalty suffered by those with a criminal record.
DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
The preceding argument for imposing harsher penalties on repeat offenders has considerable intuitive appeal, but it has relied on a fairly restrictive set of assumptions. In this section we discuss the generality of the results.
First, consider the use of fines rather than prison. Holding all other aspects of the model the same, it remains true that the minimum fines necessary to deter rational criminals are determined by constraints (1) and (2). In this respect, the results continue to hold. However, since it is costless to raise fines, any values that strictly exceed the minimum levels would be equally efficient, regardless of the number of irrational offenders. The optimal fines are therefore not uniquely determined in this case. 13 This indeterminacy is an artifact of the assumption that all crimes should be deterred. Thus, consider the case where the offender's gain, b, counts in social welfare. Specifically, suppose that b varies across offenders on [0, B] and B>y+h, where h is the social harm caused by a criminal act. In this case, some crimes are efficient, 14 and the optimal fine for first-timers is uniquely equal to h/p (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) . It turns out, however, that repeat offenders should face exactly the same fine, even in the presence of a wage penalty. The reason is that offenders fully internalize the wage cost associated with a criminal conviction, and hence make the socially correct choice between crime and legal employment without the need for the criminal sanction to reflect this cost. 15 The same logic applies to the case of non-monetary sanctions.
This reasoning suggests that the explanation for increasing sanctions advanced in this paper relies on the fact that all crimes are socially undesirable. However, even in this case it is not necessarily optimal to deter all crimes, as we have assumed, because of the costs of punishment (Kaplow, 1992) . Thus, it is worth asking whether our basic results hold in this more general setting. The answer is that they may not. Although it continues to be true that stigma deters crime by first-timers-thereby allowing society to achieve a given crime rate at a lower cost-it also lowers the marginal cost of punishing first-timers because fewer of them commit crimes and hence fewer need to be punished. These effects work in opposite directions regarding the optimal penalty for first-time offenders, making it impossible to prove in general that overall costs are minimized by punishing repeat offenders more harshly than first-timers.
Finally, consider the case of an endogenous probability of apprehension. Allowing p to be chosen optimally tends to work against escalating penalties for repeat offenders because of the seemingly inescapable conclusion that sanctions (fines or prison) should be maximal in this case, regardless of an offender's previous record (Polinsky and Shavell, 1998) . It is possible that an increasing expected sanction for repeat offenders is optimal (assuming that the probability of apprehension can be made contingent on an offender's criminal history, as suggested by Dana, 2001 ), but that would be a much weaker result and would not necessarily explain actual practice (especially if actual sanctions were decreasing).
CONCLUSION
The observed pattern of penalties in most criminal codes implies a rising sanction for repeat offenders. While this accords with common sense, economic models of crime have had unusual difficulty in explaining it. Most existing studies either find no rationale for rising penalties, or provide only qualified explanations. This paper has offered a new explanation based on the existence of the wage penalty (or stigma) suffered by convicted criminals. Although the threat of a wage penalty may help to deter some first time offenders from embarking on a life of crime, it actually hinders deterrence of those with a criminal record by making legal employment appear relatively less desirable. To counter this, the sanction for repeat offender needs to be raised.
Despite its appeal, this justification for escalating penalties, like earlier theories, seems to apply to a fairly restrictive set of circumstances-specifically, crimes that should definitely be deterred. Thus, to the extent that the practice is employed for a wider range of crimes, the model in this paper falls short of providing a truly general explanation.
